Las actas del BCE de febrero

Redacción - Jueves, 19 de Febrero

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Mucha discusión. Y muchas dudas sobre la efectividad y riesgos adicionales de comprar papel, especialmente deuda pública. Les invito a leerlo. Y especialmente la parte final.

Starting with an assessment of the monetary stimulus achieved, the "price" or "spread" dimension had exceeded initial expectations. Covered bond and ABS spreads had narrowed substantially since the start of the CBPP3 and the ABSPP. The targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) had contributed to a further decline in bank lending rates across the euro area, thereby easing borrowing conditions for firms and households. However, the "quantitative" element of the Governing Council's measures had clearly fallen short of initial expectations. The total estimated take-up over all eight TLTRO operations was significantly lower than envisaged in September 2014. In addition, regarding the evolution of the ABSPP, cumulative purchase volumes had been modest to date, in contrast to sizeable purchases of covered bonds.

Coinciding with this shortfall in quantitative stimulus, a continuous deterioration in the outlook for price stability over the medium term had been observed. The sharp decline in oil prices was, in itself, a positive factor for the economic outlook, but only if inflation expectations remained well anchored. In the current environment of very weak price developments, further falls in commodity prices had accelerated a downward trend that had been evident since the start of the sovereign debt crisis and had increased the risk that inflation might stay "too low for too long". First, a range of available inflation indicators currently stood at, or close to, their historical lows. Second, exclusion-based measures of inflation currently also displayed significantly lower resilience to negative headline inflation shocks. Third, the sharp drop in oil prices had contributed to the further fall in medium to longer-term market-based inflation expectations, thereby signalling increased risks of an unanchoring of those expectations.

Against this background, the risk of second-round effects had increased further and, with it, the risk of too prolonged a period of too low inflation. This, in turn, raised the possibility of deflationary forces setting in, which would not permit an attitude of "benign neglect".

Taking everything into account and based on the Governing Council's regular economic and monetary analyses, Mr Praet suggested that two policy options could be considered. On the one hand, it could be argued that the evidence available clearly suggested that there was a need to take action at the present meeting to provide further monetary accommodation. On the other hand, a "wait and see" approach could be preferred, so as to monitor developments further and to wait for more information to become available, for example in the context of the March 2015 ECB staff macroeconomic projections.

Due account would also need to be taken of the risks stemming from not acting at the present meeting, which might be higher than the risks stemming from acting. First, a large part of the very substantial financial price adjustment observed over recent weeks would most likely rapidly unwind if no monetary policy action were taken at the current meeting. This would effectively amount to an unwarranted tightening in the monetary policy stance. Second, the policy option of acting at the present meeting would contribute to strengthening the economic recovery, which was currently too weak to support a return of inflation rates towards levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Third, a decision to act forcefully at the current meeting should help to counteract the fall in medium to long-term inflation expectations and encourage a gradual rise of inflation back to levels below, but close to, 2%.

Some degree of caution was still expressed with regard to the potential effectiveness of sovereign bond purchases. Sovereign bond yields in the euro area had already approached rather low levels, limiting the scope for further yield compression and, consequently, the potential funding cost relief to be passed on to final borrowers' financing conditions. In addition, portfolio rebalancing effects could turn out to be more muted than envisaged given the ongoing need for balance sheet adjustment in the financial and non-financial sectors. Moreover, in the United States the capital market-based transmission channels were at work, most notably via direct effects on mortgage and housing markets and the greater role of corporate bond markets, and these factors might be weaker in the case of the euro area.

http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/prensa/Notas_y_decision/Decisiones_de_po/
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v1/url?u=http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/prensa/Notas_y_decision/Decisiones_de_po/&k=wdHsQuqY0Mqq1fNjZGIYnA%3D%3D%0A&r=0E%2FB86DoGMIOyYOOC2WhORJLdzlQt93R9jjo8N19QYU%3D%0A&m=5J9z8vVE5xNHdWPZ5HzJauGB%2BkDzWhc2y8lsNKC5WjU%3D%0A&s=6e675cc845f4107bd5147f9c2b61ab20cb8141b8904348d04da525a378d36f24

José Luis Martínez Campuzano
Estratega de Citi en España

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