Actas del FOMC: no hacer nada es peor

José Luis Martínez Campuzano - Viernes, 05 de Octubre

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Hubo una interesante discusión en el último FOMC. Las conclusiones las conocimos al acabar la Reunión: compra de MBS por 40bn. $ al mes, twist, reinversión de intereses en deuda, alargar en el tiempo la subida de tipos y dejar en el aire la posibilidad de tomar nuevas medidas. Lo cierto es que muchos consejeros abogaron por pedir mayor claridad al futuro escenario de tipos, cuantificando los indicadores (inflación y desempleo especialmente) que serían coherentes con esa primera subida de tipos ahora fijada para la segunda mitad de 2015. En general admitieron la gravedad del momento, de forma que no tomar medidas puede hacer que el crecimiento sea insuficiente para mejorar de forma sustancial el empleo. Y delimitaron los potenciales riesgos presentes y futuros:

1. tensión en los mercados (Europa);

2. potencial tensionamiento fiscal en USA;

3. subida de precios de commodities. Y en este orden.

¿Es la solución mayor compra de activos? Hubo un estudio donde se intenta responder a esta pregunta. Y, tras demostrar su efectividad, también considera que la Fed tendrá margen en el futuro para tensionar la política monetaria si fuera preciso.

Pero no todos los consejeros tienen tan claras las ideas sobre los riesgos inflacionistas de todas estas medidas expansivas. Para Bullard, también ayer en una conferencia, USA tiene un problema y no se debería buscar un repunte de la inflación para reconducirlo. "Un default parcial hoy con mayor inflación podría ser pagado vía primas de inflación en el futuro endeudamiento".

Los mercados USA reaccionaron ayer de forma apática ante las Actas. Las bolsas mantuvieron las subidas del día hasta el final de la jornada (0.6 % Dow) y el EUR se afianzó por encima de 1.30 USD.

The staff presented an analysis of various aspects of possible large-scale asset purchase programs, including a comparison of flow-based purchase programs to programs of fixed size.  The presentation reviewed the modeling approach used by the staff in estimating the financial and macroeconomic effects of such purchases.  While significant uncertainty surrounds such estimates, the presentation indicated that asset purchases could be effective in fostering more rapid progress toward the Committee's objectives.  The staff noted that, for a flow-based program, the public's understanding of the conditions under which the Committee would end purchases would shape expectations of the magnitude of the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer-term securities, and thus also influence the financial and economic effects of such a program.  The staff also discussed the potential implications of additional asset purchases for the evolution of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and income.  The presentation noted that significant additional asset purchases should not adversely affect the ability of the Committee to tighten the stance of policy when doing so becomes appropriate.  In their discussion of the staff presentation, a few participants noted the uncertainty surrounding estimates of the effects of large-scale asset purchases or the need for additional work regarding the implications of such purchases for the normalization of policy.
Committee Policy Action
Committee members saw the information received over the intermeeting period as suggesting that economic activity had continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months.  However, growth in employment had been slow, and almost all members saw the unemployment rate as still elevated relative to levels that they viewed as consistent with the Committee's mandate.   Members generally judged that without additional policy accommodation, economic growth might not be strong enough to generate sustained improvement in labor market conditions.  Moreover, while the sovereign and banking crisis in Europe had eased some recently, members still saw strains in global financial conditions as posing significant downside risks to the economic outlook.  The possibility of a larger-than expected fiscal tightening in the United States and slower global growth were also seen as downside risks.  Inflation had been subdued, even though the prices of some key commodities had increased recently.  Members generally continued to anticipate that, with longer term inflation expectations stable and given the existing slack in resource utilization, inflation over the medium term would run at or below the Committee's longerrun objective of 2 percent.
In their discussion of monetary policy for the period ahead, members generally expressed concerns about the slow pace of improvement in labor market conditions and all members but one agreed that the outlook for economic activity and inflation called for additional monetary accommodation.  Members agreed that such accommodation should be provided through both a strengthening of the forward guidance regarding the federal funds rate and purchases of additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion per month. Along with the ongoing purchases of $45 billion per month of  longer-term Treasury securities under the maturity extension program announced in June, these purchases will increase the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, and should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.  Members also agreed to maintain the Committee's existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency MBS into agency MBS.  The Committee agreed that it would closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months, and that if the outlook for the labor market did not improve substantially, it would continue its purchases of agency MBS, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate until such improvement is achieved in a context of price stability.  This flexible approach was seen as allowing the Committee to tailor its policy response over time to incoming information while incorporating conditional features that clarified the Committee's intention to improve labor market conditions, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the action by helping to bolster business and consumer confidence.  While members generally viewed the potential risks associated with these purchases as manageable, the Committee agreed that in determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, it would, as always, take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.  With regard to the forward guidance, the Committee agreed on an extension through mid-2015, in conjunction with language in the statement indicating that it expects that a highly accommodative stance of policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.  That new language was meant to clarify that the maintenance of a very low federal funds rate over that period did not reflect an expectation that the economy would remain weak, but rather reflected the Committee's intention to support a stronger economic recovery.  One member dissented from the policy decision, on the grounds that he opposed additional asset purchases and preferred to omit the calendar date from the forward guidance; in his view, it would be better to use qualitative language to describe the factors that would influence the Committee's decision to increase the target federal funds rate.

 

José Luis Martínez Campuzano es Estratega de Citi en España

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